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To reflect on the decline of American influence in the geopolitical sphere, its internal fracturing and
polarization, atrophying commitment to liberal democratic values and persistent tendency to confront global
conflicts with military solutions raises crucial questions about whether American empire is sustainable, and
whether it is in fact worth sustaining. First, how is it that a nation founded on liberal principles such as checks
and balances, limited powers and individual rights has come to embrace its opposite—that is, virtually
unbounded executive authority to stamp out security threats without regard for legal and ethical limitations?
Second, what does an executive monopoly on a militarized national security state portend for liberal
democratic institutions in an increasingly polarized, fragmented and unstable political climate? In this essay I
build on the argument advanced in The American Warfare State: I suggest that a constitutional framework built
on liberal principles like separation of powers and democratic accountability has failed to reliably limit power
or uphold the rule of law—and that evidence of the tilt toward a more authoritarian alternative has been
apparent for many decades. Although previous administrations upheld verbal affirmations of liberal
democratic norms, neither discourse nor institutional procedures alone guarantee fidelity to human rights and
legal imperatives.
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The 2016 American presidential election has fueled ongoing speculation about the 
viability of liberal democracy and the post-World War II global order. For more than a 
half century, Washington has held the moral high ground in its discourse about 
democratic norms, transparency and human rights. Meanwhile, American statecraft has 
been governed by a prevailing rationality to maintain economic and political hegemony 
and shape the global order by exercising hard and soft power throughout the world.1 
However, the US faces increasing challenges making other states comply with its agenda, 
and it has declined precipitously in its international standing. NATO members are shaken 
by the US president’s reluctance to affirm a pledge of reciprocal defense. US exit from 
the Paris accords on climate change, rejection of a nuclear pact with Iran, and the 
president’s refusal to condemn (or admit) Russian interference in the 2016 election have 
ruptured the international system and eroded faith in global stability, democracy and 
elections throughout the world. Meanwhile, pundits, scholars and others have expressed 
alarm about the weakening of traditional international alliances, the abuse of ethics in 
government, lack of fidelity to the rule of law and celebration of authoritarian behavior.  
The trends provoke fears that the waning US hegemon is destroying the 
international system that has kept the world more stable since 1945, while catapulting the 
plight of racial, ethnic and religious minorities into particularly sharp focus. Yet, while 
the US has withdrawn from multilateral institutions and endorsed isolationist (“America 
first”) rhetoric, the Pentagon’s military footprint remains outstretched in every corner of 
the globe. The US is still engaged in decades-long wars in Iraq and Afghanistan. 
Meanwhile, in 2016, the president ordered a cruise missile attack on Syrian government 
forces without congressional approval or legal justification; continued support for the 
Saudi-led coalition’s war in Yemen that has fueled one of the world’s worst humanitarian 
crises; and issued threats of “fire and fury” against North Korea raising the alarming 
prospect of nuclear war. Cold War-era arrangements empowering presidents to identify 
and eliminate threats by deploying the nation’s vast military arsenals, its invasive 
intelligence apparatus and even its nuclear stockpiles have faced little meaningful or 
sustained challenge from either political party.2 
While the 2016 election has hastened and highlighted the erosion of liberal 
democratic norms, this slippage is not simply the result of a particular election, 
administration, policy or program. Rather, US presidents since World War II have 
promoted democracy, open markets and free trade by wielding gargantuan military 
arsenals and undertaking widespread surveillance of ordinary citizens. Many historians 
and legal scholars argue that the Cold War era gave rise to a permanent “state of 
executive exception” to the normal constitutional order—thus signifying the nation’s 
sustained deviation from the rule of law, civil liberties and human rights in national 
                                                 
1For example, see Johnson, Chalmers (2001) Blowback: The Costs and Consequences of American Empire. 
4th printing ed. New York, NY: Holt; Bacevich, Andrew (2010) Washington Rules: America’s Path to 
Permanent War. New York, NY: Metropolitan Books.  
2 While there are some a few signs of resistance, most of these efforts thus far are largely symbolic. For 
instance, the US House offered a resolution to cut off support for the Saudi government’s war on Yemen, 
but House leadership stripped the resolution of privileged status (which would have required a floor vote). 
Meanwhile, the prospect of nuclear exchange with North Korea provoked discussion of resolutions 
forbidding the president from ordering a nuclear attack without express congressional approval. However, 
these resolutions may not have majority support.  
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security realms.3 What is unprecedented today, then, is not so much the betrayal of liberal 
norms, but rather the degree to which liberal discourse has yielded to tacit and explicit 
support for authoritarian tactics and the extent to which liberal democratic principles, 
institutions and values are simultaneously being abandoned by large parts of the 
American population.4  
To reflect on the decline of American influence in the geopolitical sphere, its 
internal fracturing and polarization, atrophying commitment to liberal democratic values 
and persistent tendency to confront global conflicts with military solutions raises crucial 
questions about whether American empire is sustainable, and whether it is in fact worth 
sustaining.5 First, how is it that a nation founded on liberal principles such as checks and 
balances, limited powers and individual rights has come to embrace its opposite—that is, 
virtually unbounded executive authority to stamp out security threats without regard for 
legal and ethical limitations? Second, what does an executive monopoly on a militarized 
national security state portend for liberal democratic institutions in an increasingly 
polarized, fragmented and unstable political climate?  
In The American Warfare State, I argue that the nation’s unprecedented military 
mobilization during World War II created new political and economic interests in 
military spending and war that constitutional framers did not anticipate.6 I found that, in 
subsequent decades, large defense budgets were not only a response to heightened 
national security concerns, but also an integral component of many local and regional 
economies—particularly in geographically remote areas that lack diverse economies. 
Meanwhile, the public burdens historically associated with large military establishments 
                                                 
3 For several notable examples, see Scheppele, Kim (2004) “Law in a Time of Emergency: States of 
Exception and the Temptations of 9/11,” 6 PA J. Const. L 1001; Ackerman, Bruce (2010) The Decline and 
Fall of the American Republic. Cambridge, MA: President and Fellows of Harvard College;  
Ackerman (2004) “The Emergency Constitution,” 113 Yale Law Journal 1029; Ely, John Hart (1993) 
Constitutional Lessons from Vietnam and Its Aftermath. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press; Fisher, 
Louis (2004) Presidential War Power. 2nd ed. Lawrence, KY: University Press of Kansas; Koh, Harold 
Hongju (1990) The National Security Constitution: Sharing Power after the Iran-Contra Affair. New 
Haven, CT: Yale University Press; Rudalevige, Andrew (2006) The New Imperial President: Renewing 
Presidential Power after Watergate. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press; Schlesinger, Arthur M., 
Jr. (2004 [1973]) The Imperial Presidency. New York: Houghton Mifflin; Owens, John E. (2006), 
“Presidential Power and Congressional Acquiescence in the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A New Constitutional 
Equilibrium?” Politics & Policy 34: 258–30.  
4 On declining support for liberal democracy, see Hunter, James Davison and Carl Desportes Bowman 
(2016) The Vanishing Center of American Democracy: The 2016 Survey on American Political Culture, 
Charlottesville, VA: Institute for Advanced Studies in Culture, 18; Brown, Wendy (2003) “Neoliberalism 
and the End of Liberal Democracy,” Theory & Event 7:1; Hibbing, John R. and Elizabeth Theiss-Morse 
(2002) Stealth Democracy: America’s Beliefs About How Government Should Work. New York, NY: 
Cambridge University Press. On explicit US support for authoritarian regimes, see Freedland, Jonathan, 
“Year One: Trump’s Foreign Affairs,” New York Review of Books, November 16, 2017. (For instance, 
President Trump applauded the Philippines President Rodrigo Duterte for an anti-drug campaign that 
resulted in killings of thousands of minor dealers and users, congratulated the Turkish President Recep 
Tayyip Erdogan in the midst of a repressive state-led campaign arresting more than 100,000 Turkish 
citizens, dissolving the judiciary and suppressing the media and commended Egypt’s president Abdel 
Faettah al-Sisi who has locked up tens of thousands of dissidents. 
5 McCoy, Alfred (2017) In the Shadows of the American Century: The Rise and Decline of US Global 
Power. Chicago, IL: Haymarket Books; Bacevich (2010).  
6 Thorpe, Rebecca U. (2014) The American Warfare State: The Domestic Politics of Military Spending. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
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and warfare shifted onto a small minority of military volunteers, future generations of 
taxpayers who will inherit the nation’s war debts and foreign populations where US wars 
take place. These new arrangements encourage legislators to support large defense 
budgets, while freeing presidents to launch military actions without congressional 
authorization or democratic deliberation—an outcome that the constitutional framers 
feared and tried to prevent.  
In this essay I build on the argument advanced in The American Warfare State: I 
suggest that a constitutional framework built on liberal principles like separation of 
powers and democratic accountability has failed to reliably limit power or uphold the rule 
of law—and that evidence of the tilt toward a more authoritarian alternative has been 
apparent for many decades. Although previous administrations upheld verbal affirmations 
of liberal democratic norms, neither discourse nor institutional procedures alone 
guarantee fidelity to human rights and legal imperatives—at least not without a more 
robust commitment to these ideals and a political environment where “law is valued as 
principle rather than tactic.”7 
To make this case, I document patterns of executive lawlessness in the conduct of 
national security policy, with a particular emphasis on military interrogations and 
targeted killings in the George W. Bush and Barack Obama administrations. Though I 
emphasize twenty-first century practices, these precedents are not new. Rather, since 
Congress authorized a national security apparatus in 1947 and provided new financial 
incentives to maintain a permanent military-industrial base, both real and perceived 
security threats have rationalized the use of force and relaxed moral and legal standards 
that may otherwise constrain executive conduct. Moreover, the rise of a national security 
state equipped to kill suspects anywhere in the world and cipher intelligence through 
extra-legal channels developed democratically and with little coherent resistance. Far 
from “ambition… counteracting ambition,” the different branches and levels of 
government have come to perceive mutually overlapping interests in expanding the 
national security state, swelling executive prerogative, and pursuing foreign policy 
through martial means.8  
As a result, an executive monopoly over a heavily militarized, clandestine 
national security establishment is routinely deployed without regard for human rights, 
civil liberties or nation-state sovereignty. The consequences today, in an especially 
fraught and fragile political climate, are two-fold: First, this arrangement allows 
presidents—however volatile, intemperate, or characteristically unfit— to pursue their 
military and intelligence policies as they please, while the most violent and degrading 
consequences are borne by ethnic or religious minorities and foreign populations in 
countries where US security operations take place. Second, these practices also 
systematically weaken America’s democratic institutions, norms and values, rendering 
the regime more vulnerable to authoritarian challenges.  
 
 
 
                                                 
7 Quoting Brown (2003); also see Hunter, James Davidson, “Liberal Democracy & the Unraveling of the 
Enlightenment Project,” The Hedgehog Review, 19: Fall 2017. 
8 Quoting Madison, James (1787) “Federalist 51” in Rossiter, Clinton, ed. 2003. The Federalist Papers. 
New York, NY: Signet Classics; also see Thorpe (2014); Bacevich (2010). 
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Executive Power & Lawlessness 
 
US political institutions are organized against despotism and lawlessness.9 
However, since President Truman referred to the Korean War as a “police action” (using 
a semantic maneuver to explain the absence of a formal congressional declaration of 
war), post-World War II presidents have redefined and codified plenary executive war 
powers as consistent with the normal constitutional order—although administrations have 
done so to varying degrees and for different purposes.  
Since the onset of the Cold War, presidents have conducted hundreds of military 
operations without authorization or public deliberation, promoted private armies, 
subverted legitimate and even democratic governments, abrogated principles of national 
sovereignty and undermined liberties codified in the Bill of Rights. The George W. Bush 
administration provoked particularly acute concerns about executive overreach after the 
attacks of September 11, 2001. The Bush administration expanded and legally 
rationalized many of the policies that were implemented covertly during the Cold War—
including a broad cloak of executive secrecy, official military and CIA interrogation 
policies widely associated with torture, the use of targeted killings overseas, and an 
expansive legal dragnet of domestic surveillance.10 Despite his vocal opposition to 
President Bush’s national security framework, the Obama administration retained many 
of the same strategies and aggressively expanded others, while repudiating several of the 
most egregious human rights abuses (e.g., official use of water-boarding (near-drowning) 
and other policies considered to be torture).11  
Despite many of the sweeping powers exercised, US presidents never needed to 
disrupt democratic processes or dissolve political institutions in order to usurp new 
powers. Rather than acting as a check on executive power, post-World War II Congresses 
exploited new fiscal and military instruments to simultaneously restrict Soviet power 
(and later, combat international terrorism), advance the West’s political and economic 
models, and maintain the nation’s military-industrial and technological base.12 Congress 
                                                 
9 While the American Constitution admits of instances where emergency government might be necessary, 
US constitutional provisions ensure that states of emergency are limited, defined and operate under the 
auspices of separation of powers principles. For instance, the Third Amendment prohibits the quartering of 
soldiers in households but carves out a wartime exception following a formal act of Congress. Article I, 
Section 9 limits Congress’ power to suspend habeas corpus (the right to challenge the basis of 
imprisonment) only to cases in which rebellion or invasion may require it.  
10 See Pfiffner, James P. (2006) “Constraining Executive Power: George W. Bush and the Constitution.” 
Presidential Studies Quarterly 38:1; Schuerman, William E. (2006) “Survey Article: Emergency Powers 
and the Rule of Law After 9/11,” The Journal of Political Philosophy, 14: 61-84; Owens (2006); Ackerman 
(2004); Rudalevige (2006). For exemplary accounts of Cold War policy see Blum, William (1995) Killing 
Hope: Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II, Common Courage Press; McCoy, Alfred W. 
(2006) A Question of Torture: CIA Interrogation from the Cold War to the War on Terror, New York: 
Metropolitan Books; Schlesinger  (1973 [2004]). Also see below for further elaboration.  
11 Goldsmith, Jack (2012) Power and Constraint: The Accountable Presidency After 9/11, New York: W. 
W. Norton (arguing that the nation’s expansion of presidential power under George W. Bush traces back 
over two centuries and is largely codified by legislators, courts and media and the Obama administration).  
12 In every decade since World War II, the weapons industry has generated hundreds of billions of dollars 
per year, supplied millions of defense-sector jobs and tens of millions of “defense related” jobs. These 
figures do not include millions of uniformed military personnel or Department of Defense civilian 
employees stationed at the Pentagon, domestic military bases or overseas. On the importance of military 
investments for local, regional and even national economies, see Kennedy, David M. (2001), Freedom 
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authorized the National Security Council (NSC) as a White House forum for national 
security decisions, gave the new Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) untraceable funds to 
raise its own armies and conduct secret operations overseas, and invested hundreds of 
billions of dollars in military technologies each year to fuel the nation’s military 
machine.13 Presidents have capitalized on these resources by exercising virtually 
unbounded “emergency” powers and redefining their own legal authority, even after each 
specific threat receded or disappeared—the very outcomes that institutional arrangements 
were designed to prevent. 
 
 
Military Interrogations & Human Rights 
 
Although the United States has a long, sordid history of torture, from convict 
leasing in the Jim Crow South to US war crimes during the military occupation of the 
Philippines, these brutal practices were not centrally controlled or directly monitored by 
the top levels of government. After the nation established a large Pentagon footprint to 
fight the Cold War, military and CIA interrogation techniques widely associated with 
torture became “centralized, systematized and rationalized.”14 Most notoriously, the Bush 
administration Department of Justice issued secret memoranda to authorize torture, 
euphemistically called “enhanced interrogation,” against suspected terrorists captured or 
implicated in the “war on terror.”15 The leaking of the Bush memos and the lurid 
photographs of the atrocities committed at the Abu Ghraib prison outside of Baghdad 
drew attention to the government’s use of coercive interrogation in Iraq, Afghanistan, 
Guantanamo Bay, its covert “black sites” operated by the CIA, and the practice of 
extraordinary rendition, where prisoners are sent to be tortured by governments such as 
Egypt, Syria and Jordan.16 Although Abu Ghraib has become a notorious symbol of 
abuse, intelligence agencies routinely outsource interrogation to foreign nations in order 
                                                                                                                                                 
From Fear: The American People in Depression and War. New York, NY: Oxford; Wright, Gavin (1986). 
Old South: New South: Revolutions in the Southern Economy Since the Civil War. New York, NY: Basic 
Books; Markuson, Ann, Peter Hall, Scott Campbell, and Sabina Deitrick (1991) The Rise of the Gunbelt: 
The Military Remapping of Industrial America. New York, NY: Oxford University Press; Ledbetter, James 
(2011), Unwarranted Influence: Dwight E. Eisenhower and the Military-Industrial Complex. New Haven, 
CT: Yale University Press; Katznelson, Ira (2013). Fear Itself: The New Deal and the Origins of Our Time. 
New York, NY: W.W. Norton; Thorpe (2014). 
13 The National Security Act of 1947 established a National Security Council (NSC), created the office of 
Secretary of Defense to unify the military departments and made the air force a separate service. Two years 
later, Congress passed the CIA Act of 1949, which exempts the Agency from disclosing its “organization, 
functions, officials, titles, salaries, or numbers of personnel employed.” The Act also authorized a classified 
black budget for overseas operations.  
14 Quoting Mayerfeld, Jamie (2007), “Playing by Our Own Rules: How US Marginalization of International 
Human Rights Law Led to Torture,” Harvard Human Rights Journal 20: 99; also see Blum (1995), McCoy 
(2006) for a brutal history of CIA and military actions and interrogation practices post-World War II. 
15 Memorandum from Jay Bybee and John Yoo in Office of the Assistant Attorney General to Alberto 
Gonzalez, Counsel to the President, Re: Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. Section 
2340-2340A, August 1, 2002, accessed at: news.findlaw.com/wp/docs/doj/bybee80102mem.pdf 
16 Mayer, Jane (2008), The Dark Side: An inside Look at How the War on Terror Turned into a War on 
American Ideals. New York, NY: Doubleday (see chapter 6-7 on “outsourcing torture” and black sites); 
Amnesty International (2006), Below the Radar: Secret Flights to Torture and “Disappearance, accessed 
at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/AMR51/051/2006/en 
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to obtain information in the war on terrorism. US court precedents weakening evidential 
standards and constitutional protections against torture have reinforced these practices.17 
To simultaneously condemn torture and legitimize current practices as consistent 
with existing law, the Bush documents redefined policies commonly considered torture 
and devised semantic exemptions from national and international legal frameworks. The 
sanitized language of “enhanced” interrogation provided a legal black hole for near-
drowning (water-boarding), sleep deprivation, stress positions, attack dogs, forced nudity, 
sexual humiliations, extreme temperatures and hypothermia, despite instances of 
permanent injury or death.18 To evade a series of US anti-torture statutes, the 
administration claimed that these practices are legally defensible as long as the victim’s 
suffering is not the interrogators’ “specific intent,” suggesting that interrogators may not 
be culpable unless their actions are demonstrably sadistic.19 The administration 
circumvented international law prohibiting the abuse of “prisoners of war” under the 
Geneva Conventions by reclassifying prisoners as “enemy combatants.”20 The Office of 
Legal Council also argued that aliens abroad are not guaranteed rights and privileges in 
the Fifth and Eight Amendments of the US Constitution, which prohibit the deprivation 
of liberty without due process, compelled self-incrimination, and cruel and unusual 
punishment, respectively.21 Meanwhile, the administration maintained that the president’s 
power as commander-in-chief of the armed forces admits of no constitutional limitation 
aside from funding restrictions that legislators might impose.22  
Although the Obama administration retreated from this view of plenary 
presidential power and outlawed torture techniques, the president found alternative legal 
rationales to conduct overseas military operations unilaterally. President Obama 
announced an open-ended war against the Islamic State (ISIS) in September 2014, but 
                                                 
17 These practices also blur legal distinction between terrorism and criminal justice cases. See Condon, 
Jenny-Brooke (2008) “Extraterritorial Interrogation: The Porous Border Between Torture and U.S. 
Criminal Trials,” 60 Rutgers Law Review 647-704.  
18 These abuses are well documented by Amnesty international, as well as legal and human rights scholars. 
For the critical accounts grounded in positive and natural law, see Waldron, Jeremy (2005) “Torture and 
Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White House,” 105 Columbia Law Review 1681-1750; Mayerfeld, 
Jamie (2016) The Promise of Human Rights: Constitutional Government, Democratic Legitimacy, and 
International Law. Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press; Scheppele (2004). For empirical 
documentation, see Owens (2006); Pfiffer (2005); Levinson 2006 ed.; American Civil Liberties Union 
(2006), Enduring Abuse: Torture and Cruel Treatment by the United States at Home and Abroad, accessed 
at http://www.aclu.org/safefree/torture/torture_report.pdf. For a defense of (non-lethal) torture techniques 
in the war on terrorism, see Dershowitz, Alan (2002) Why Terrorism Works: Understanding the Threat, 
Responding to the Challenge, New Haven: Yale University Press.  
19 Bybee-Yoo Memorandum 2002; for a detailed account also see, Mayerfeld (2016).  
20 For meticulous treatment on the US violation of international law, see Paust, Jordan (2005) “Executive 
Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of 
Detainees,” 48 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 811; for a contrasting argument, see Paulsen, 
Michael Stokes (2009) “The Constitutional Power to Interpret International Law,” 118 Yale Law Journal 
1762 (arguing for the supremacy of the US Constitution, national sovereignty and the president’s 
emergency powers as limiting factors in the application of international law).  
21 See Waldron (2005); Mayerfeld (2007, 2016); Condon (2008).  
22 This view of plenary executive war powers is commonly associated with John Yoo, the Deputy Assistant 
Director of the Office of Legal Council during the George W. Bush administration. See Yoo, John (2005) 
The Powers of War & Peace: The Constitution and Foreign Affairs After 9/11. Chicago, IL: University of 
Chicago Press; Yoo, John (1999) “The Misuse of History in the War Powers Debate,” 70 U. Colorado L. 
Rev. 1169-1222.  
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failed to obtain congressional approval for his military campaign within the next 60 days 
as required by the 1973 War Powers Resolution. While he claimed to act “consistently 
with the War Powers Resolution,” he asserted that the Authorizations for Military Force 
(AUMFs) that Congress passed in 2001 against al-Qaeda and 2002 against Saddam 
Hussein also authorized the new war against ISIS—even though ISIS and its predecessor, 
al-Qaeda in Iraq, did not exist at the time of the authorization. According to one 
estimation, the Obama administration dropped at least 26,171 bombs in seven majority-
Muslim nations in 2016 alone—many of which fell outside of any legally recognized US 
battlefield. 23  
The Trump administration has expanded Obama’s readiness to initiate bombing 
campaigns, air strikes and ground raids outside of formal US war zones in order to 
accomplish the president’s foreign policy objectives, while also resurrecting the view of 
plenary executive power most notoriously implemented by the Bush administration. 
While Trump also promised to bring back torture during his presidential campaign, 
simply continuing the practice of extraordinary rendition—where suspects are transported 
to countries with weak due process laws for interrogation and imprisonment—provides a 
less visible alternative.24 According to the Senate Intelligence Report on CIA 
interrogation programs, President Clinton first approved extraordinary rendition for 
Bosnian terror suspects who were tortured in Egyptians prisons where they were 
transferred. 25 The Bush administration expanded the practice, routinely transporting 
suspects from CIA black sites in places such as Pakistan and Morocco. Barack Obama 
also sent detainees to third world countries for imprisonment, although there is no public 
evidence that abusive interrogation methods were employed. President Trump will likely 
reinforce this trend, as indicated by his commitment to work with countries like Russia—
a nation guilty of notorious war crimes in Syria and Chechnya—in order to interrogate 
captives associated with terrorist networks. 
Presidential scholar Edward Corwin ominously forecasted the Orwellian 
maneuver to legally codify an unlimited scope of action in 1947, reflecting that, “[The] 
inherent [presidential] power theory logically guarantees the constitutional adequacy of 
the war power by equating it with the actual power of the nation in waging war. It makes 
the full power of the nation constitutionally available.”26 Most legislators refuse to 
challenge the executive’s national security policies, and few Americans are directly 
affected. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
23 See Benjamin, Medea, “American dropped 26,171 bombs in 2016,” The Guardian, January 9, 2017, 
accessed at https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2017/jan/09/america-dropped-26171-bombs-
2016-obama-legacy  
24  Landay, Jonathan and Mark Hosenball, “Trump May Reinstate Secret Black Site Prisons,” Reuters, 
January 25, 2017, accessed at https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trump-prisons/trump-may-reinstate-
secret-cia-black-site-prisons-u-s-officials-idUSKBN15922L 
25 Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence, Committee Study of the Central Intelligence Agency’s 
Interrogation Program, S. Report 113-288, Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, December 9, 
2014.  
26 Corwin, Edward (1947) Total War & the Constitution. New York, NY:. Knopf, 37 (italics in original). 
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Targeted Killings 
 
Rather than dismantling President Bush’s controversial national security 
framework, Barack Obama scaled back highly visible wars in Iraq and Afghanistan while 
extending the aerial battlefield further into Syria, Pakistan, Yemen, Somalia and Libya. In 
doing so, he expanded the more clandestine counterterrorism tactic of eliminating 
individual suspects through targeted assassinations.  
Targeted killings refer to “the intentional slaying of a specific individual or group 
of individuals…with explicit governmental approval.”27 The White House and NSC 
formulate a list for kill/capture raids or strikes from unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), 
which are executed by CIA or Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC) forces from 
remote locations based on classified intelligence information. These raids and strikes take 
place outside of any sphere of judicial protection or military chain of command.28 While 
unmanned aerial vehicles (drones) were combat-ready during the Vietnam War and 
crucial to the US interventions in 1995 Balkans crisis and 1999 Kosovo War, drone 
technologies transformed the nature of warfare during the war on terrorism.   
In 2004, President Bush initiated a CIA-operated drone campaign in the Federally 
Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, which culminated in 46 drone strikes directed at 
killing “high-value” targets. By the end of 2013, the Obama administration launched an 
additional 360 strikes in Pakistan alone.29 All told, President Obama signed off on 563 
aerial strikes outside of recognized battlefields—10 times more than his predecessor 
did.30 To situate these actions with a legal framework, the Obama administration claimed 
that the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force implicitly permits military strikes 
aimed to kill terrorist targets, regardless of their physical location or actual involvement 
in the 9/11 attacks. Obama’s Attorney General Eric Holder and State Department legal 
advisor Harold Koh defended a “kill list” that included the American citizen and Islamic 
cleric Anwar al-Awlaki as constitutionally permissible, despite laws of warfare 
prohibiting the intentional killing of religious officials.31  
In 2017, the Trump administration dismantled the few rules and regulations 
governing drone strikes and ground raids outside of US war zones that the Obama 
administration established. First, the administration expanded license to conduct targeted 
killings by elite military forces and the CIA to include foot soldiers without any special 
training. Second, the regime lifted vetting procedures for drone assaults and ground 
                                                 
27 Buckley, Ahmed (2012) “Smiting Spell: The Legality of Targeted Killings in the War Against 
Terrorism,” Journal of East Asia and International Law 5: 39.  
28 Alson, Philip (2011) “The CIA and Targeted Killings Beyond Borders,” 2 Harvard Natl Sec Journal 283.   
29 See Bill Roggio and Alexander Mayer’s database, accessed at http://www.longwarjournal.org/pakistan-
strikes.php; also see Gregory, Derek (2011) “From a View to Kill: Drones and Late Modern War,” Theory, 
Culture & Society 28:188; Shaw, Ian Graham Ronald and Majed Akhter (2012) “The Unbearable 
Humanness of Drone Warfare in FATA, Pakistan,” Antipode 44: 1492  
30 The figures do not include air strikes in Syria, Iraq, Libya and Afghanistan. See Purkiss, Jessica and Jack 
Serle, “Obama’s Covert Drone War in Numbers: Ten Times More Strikes Than Bush,” The Bureau of 
Investigative Journalism, January 17, 2017, accessed at 
https://www.thebureauinvestigates.com/stories/2017-01-17/obamas-covert-drone-war-in-numbers-ten-
times-more-strikes-than-bush. 
31 Shaw (2012, 1505).  
 9 
raids.32 Under these new criteria, the US has dramatically increased the use of drones in 
Somalia and Yemen, while continuing to conduct drone attacks in Pakistan—all regions 
outside of official US battlefields.  
Meanwhile, after two years of US support for Saudi Arabia’s blockade and 
bombing campaign in Yemen, extreme food and fuel shortages, a cholera epidemic and 
massive displacement have developed into what UNICEF, the World Food Program, and 
the World Health Organization have called one the worst humanitarian crises in the 
world.33 Meanwhile, the Saudi’s blockade prevents the delivery of fuel, food and 
humanitarian relief. Although the US House of Representatives voted to say that it has 
not authorized war in Yemen, the House did not withdraw funding or do anything to end 
the conflict.34 Instead, the Trump administration continues to aid Saudi bombers while 
the number of aerial assaults in Yemen shot up at least 250 percent.35 At the same time, 
the administration relaxed restrictions on the military’s use of force against Shabaab 
fighters in Somalia, while also expanding its targeting to include the Islamic State. 
According the Council of Foreign Relations, the Trump administration has already 
surpassed his predecessor in the use drone warfare outside of official battlefields, 
averaging one attack or raid every 1.25 days (compared to one attack every 5.4 days 
under Obama).36 
The absence of a legal regime or formal disclosure mechanisms for targeted 
killings meet the criteria defined by Kim Scheppele and Giorgio Agamben as a “state of 
exception.”37 In this formulation, judicial protections of law are suspended and the 
sovereign assumes plenary authority to preserve the community in the face of existential 
threat. Clandestine drone warfare outside of formal warzones operates on the margins of 
international and national law, while simultaneously expanding the geographic space of 
war. Geographer Derek Gregory labels this phenomenon “the everywhere war,” 
characterizing a global war that is “infinitely extendible,” including not only the 
Afghanistan-Pakistan region where terrorist networks seek safe haven, but also U.S-
Mexican border threatened with “insurgent” drug cartels and traffickers.38  
                                                 
32 “Trump Looking to Loosen Obama Era Limits on Drone Strikes,” Al Jazeera News, September 22, 2017, 
accessed at http://www.aljazeera.com/news/2017/09/loosen-obama-limits-drone-strikes-
170922141205178.html 
33 “When Food is Used as a Weapon” CBS News Report, November 19, 2017, accessed at 
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/when-food-is-used-as-a-weapon/ 
34 H. Res. 599, Passed House on November 13, 2017 (stating that “Congress has not enacted specific 
legislation authorizing the use of military force against parties participating in the Yemini civil war that are 
not otherwise subject to the Authorization of Use of Military Force (PL 107-40) or the Authorization of 
Use of Military Force in Iraq (PL 107-243)”).  
35 See reporting by Alexandra Gutowski, The Long War Journal, November 17, 2017, accessed at 
https://www.longwarjournal.org/archives/2017/11/details-remain-vague-after-four-more-us-strikes-against-
aqap-in-yemen.php 
36Zenko, Micah, “The (Not-So) Peaceful Transition of Power: Trump’s Drone Strikes Outpace Obama’s,” 
The Council of Foreign Relations, March 2, 2017, accessed at https://www.cfr.org/blog/not-so-peaceful-
transition-power-trumps-drone-strikes-outpace-obama 
37 Scheppelle (2004); Agamben, Giorgio (2005) State of Exception, Chicago: University of Chicago Press; 
for the original formulation, see Carl Schmitt (1985 [1922]), Political Theology: Four Chapters on the 
Concept of Sovereignty. George Schwab trans., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. (“Sovereign is he who decides 
on the exception.”)  
38 Gregory, Derek (2011) “The Everywhere War,” The Geographic Journal 177: 242.  
 10 
Although drone strikes are marketed as “surgical, sensitive and scrupulous,” the 
strategy also perpetuates patterns of insurgencies and counter-insurgencies with civilian 
populations caught in the crossfire.39 While available evidence suggests that drones 
increase the precision of military strikes and limit risks to civilian populations (compared 
to missiles and bombing campaigns), the potential for human error and the willingness to 
risk to innocent lives in order to eliminate high-level military targets puts civilians in 
considerable lethal jeopardy. Desensitizing language (“collateral damage”) and the 
Obama-era policy of counting all military-age males in combat zones as potential military 
targets dampen formally recognized risks to civilian populations and the official number 
of civilian deaths even more.  
Despite legal and ethical objections, drone warfare is highly tempting from both a 
military and political perspective. Drones are cheaper to buy, maintain and operate than 
most military aircraft. Since pilotless aircraft are operated at remote distances far from an 
actual battlefield, they also reduce American casualties, troop counts and the risks for US 
military personnel. At the same time, these technologies further insulate Americans from 
the conduct of war. People are less invested in what the government does when they are 
not asked to sacrifice and American lives are not put in harms way. More than one in 
every ten Americans risked their lives during World War II, and nearly half a million 
Americans lost their lives. However, given the elimination of the draft, use of private 
military and security contractors and advances in military technologies, fewer than one in 
every thousand Americans fought in Iraq or Afghanistan. The intensification of drone 
strikes shrink these numbers even more. As fewer Americans are asked to sacrifice their 
lives or livelihoods in order to wage war, citizens increasingly disengage from foreign 
policy or even take notice of US military activities.40  
 
 
Conclusion 
 
In the late eighteenth century, the architects of the US Constitution questioned 
whether popular sovereignty was sustainable if the people pursued nothing but their 
interests or refused to serve a common good. The republican experiment that resulted was 
premised on trust that individuals would embrace the value of popular sovereignty, 
uphold (at least) thin understandings of civic virtue, accept standards for public 
deliberation and judgment such as empiricism, logic and truth and hold the separate 
branches of government accountable based on these criteria. If citizens or their political 
leaders abandon the institutions and values on which the regime is premised then political 
authority and legitimacy are vulnerable to collapse.  
While our current political moment is particularly precarious, the drift toward 
consolidated power and lawlessness has deep roots in the national security architecture 
authorized in 1947 and reinforced after September 11, 2001. Kim Scheppele, Bruce 
                                                 
39 Quoting Gregory (2011, 239).  
40 Mueller, John (1973) War, Presidents and Public Opinion. New York, NY: John Wiley and Sons; 
Mueller, John (2005) “The Iraq Syndrome.” Foreign Affairs 84:44–45; Grose, Christian R., and Bruce I. 
Oppenheimer (2007) “The Iraq War, Partisanship, and Candidate Attributes: Variation in Partisan Swing in 
the 2006 U.S. House Elections.” Legislative Studies Quarterly 32:531–57; Kriner, Douglas L. and Francis 
X. Shen (2010) The Casualty Gap: The Causes and Consequences of American Wartime Inequalities. New 
York, NY: Oxford University Press.  
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Ackerman, Ira Katzenlson and other excellent scholars identify the Cold War and attacks 
of September 11, 2001 as catalysts fomenting an era of permanent emergency and 
suspension of normal practice, which undermine separation of powers, international law, 
and human rights. Unlike its European allies, the US sought refuge in expansive 
executive powers and a sprawling military umbrella in order to meet the new perils of 
communism and international terrorism. The response signifies not only nation’s 
divergent reaction to centralized authority in wake of Nazism and horrors of fascism, but 
also reflects Americans’ widely shared interests in perpetuating a national security state, 
regardless of the destabilizing consequences.41  
Our political institutions failed to prevent a consolidation of executive power over 
matters of war and defense because members of Congress and a majority of voters 
perceive shared benefits from these arrangements. More broadly, this outcome reveals 
that governmental forms are not inherently self-regulating—that is, institutional 
arrangements do not guarantee that interests will clash (upholding checks and balances) 
or that they will cede to reason, law or the common good (promoting stability and 
compromise).  Rather, unforeseen geopolitical, economic, and social changes promote 
new interests and alliances that wreak havoc with self-regulating interests and 
competitive branches.42 In the case of the national security apparatus, the resulting 
distortion—executive authority to stamp out security threats without regard for legal and 
ethical limitations—reflects the durability of governmental forms void of broader 
commitment to the goals they were meant to achieve. Meanwhile, the nation’s domestic 
politics are ironically driven by the rancorous partisan and “plebiscitary” goals that the 
framers loathed and sought to avoid.43 Moreover, presidents never needed to co-opt 
power by dissolving Congress and courts or obstructing democratic processes.  Rather 
than jealously guarding defense resources and preventing the executive from 
monopolizing force, legislators freely delegate resources and authority for presidents to 
achieve their goals militarily. These arrangements facilitate new forms of lawlessness that 
both modern and classical thinkers equated with elected despotism.  
This failure of liberal democratic institutions should not be understood as an 
isolated incident, but as a symptom of a larger failure to implement structural remedies to 
social, political and, ultimately, human, problems. Unlike fascist regimes and military 
dictatorships, the American government maintained its formal constitutional 
arrangements throughout the Cold War, after the attacks of September 11, 2001, and (as 
of this writing) in the Trump era. However, while the US Constitution has nimbly 
adjusted to accommodate extensive reinterpretations without appearing to fail, new 
                                                 
41 See Thorpe (2014); Bacevich (2010). 
42 Most prominently, see Mills, C. Wright (1956 [2000]) The Power Elite. New York: Oxford University 
Press.  
43 See Madison, Federalist 10 in Rossiter (2003) (on the “turbulence,” “contention” and “violence” of pure 
democracy); Skowronek, Stephen (1997) The Politics Presidents Make: Leadership From John Adams to 
Bill Clinton. Revised ed. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press (describing the changing bastion of support for 
the presidency); also see Wilentz, Sean (2005) The Rise of American Democracy: Jefferson to Lincoln. 
New York, NY: W.W. Norton (on the rise of American democracy); Wood, Gordon (1993) The Radicalism 
of the American Revolution. New York, NY: First Vintage Books, 369 (on the rejection of elite virtue and 
embrace of popular democracy in the early years of the republic); Lee, Frances (2016) Insecure Majorities: 
Congress and the Perpetual Campaign. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press (on partisan competition 
for power).   
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political pressures empower presidents to purge suspected enemies by operating outside 
of the law for an indefinite duration—an outcome that a liberal regime of checks and 
balances was meant to prevent. The US has coherently maintained its democratic 
institutions while “extending American power as if the country [was] still engaged in 
total warfare”44 because most Americans perceive benefits from the security umbrella 
that the military establishment provides—regardless of illiberal, inhumane and otherwise 
intolerable costs borne elsewhere. 
 
 
 
                                                 
44 Katznelson (2013, 409). (“Acting with wide discretion…specialized, often insular agencies built military 
might, oversaw the multiplication of atomic weapons, pursued intelligence, and practiced covert action, all 
in the name of liberal democracy. Premised on the assumption that the United States was freedom’s 
indispensible guardian, these organizations extended American power as if the country were still engaged 
in total warfare.”)  
